Abstract-This paper presents a certification model for Nonrepudiation (NR) of cloud storage services. NR, i.e., the possession of proofs that certain exchanges have taken place amongst interacting parties, is a significant security property for cloud data storage services. Our model for certifying NR is based on continuous monitoring and has been defined and realised according to the CUMULUS approach. It also corresponds to certification of level 3 maturity in the reference certification framework of Cloud Security Alliance.
INTRODUCTION
Despite the fast growth of cloud services, security is still a main barrier for their adoption. Cloud computing is aimed at providing users with efficient and flexible services. At the basic cloud infrastructure layer, these services include compute and data storage services [4] [5] both of which must be secure [4] [5] [11] [13] . Nevertheless, storing data in clouds is still a concern from a security point of view, as several incidents cast doubt on the level of security offered by cloud storage services. Examples of such incidents include the corruption of Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3) leading to stored files no longer matching customers' hashes [6] and an access-control bug in Google Docs that allowed unauthorized access to documents [14] . Although security properties as confidentiality, authentication, access control, and availability have been studied thoroughly for clouds, non-repudiation has only been recently investigated in this context [9] .
Non-repudiation (NR) is a property of data storage, requiring that when a data owner (consumer) sends a request to a cloud provider for uploading (downloading) data, the data uploading (downloading) transaction should be conducted in a way such that neither the data owner (consumer) nor the cloud data storage provider could deny having participated in a part or the whole of this transaction. Several protocols have been proposed to realise non-repudiation (e.g., [4] [7] [11] [12] [15] [16] ). The basic principle that underpins these protocols is that along with a data uploading (downloading) request the data owner (consumer) sends a "Non-Repudiation of Origin" (NRO) token, i.e., a proof of sending the request, and expects to receive evidence of "NonRepudiation of Receipt" (NRR) from the cloud provider, acknowledging that the specific request was received.
Whilst these protocols have been proven to provide NR under given assumptions, their implementation can have bugs or suffer from attacks, such as man-in-the-middle, replay or timeline attacks [4] . Therefore, certifying the correct implementation of protocols and the robustness of their implementation to these types of attack is necessary for giving cloud customers the assurances required for NR.
In this paper we present an approach for certifying the implementation of an NR protocol mechanism that is based on the fair multi-party non-repudiation (MPNR) scheme proposed in [4] . Our certification scheme is based on a continuous monitoring approach that we introduced in [10] , as part of the CUMULUS project [3] . More specifically, it is based on monitoring the actual operations of cloud services to gather evidence enabling a continuous assessment of the satisfaction of the security property of interest. Under this approach, a certificate for the security property is issued when the accumulated evidence is sufficient (e.g., it covers a required spectrum of service usage scenarios) and there is no violation of the security property within the monitoring period. Hence, our approach corresponds to level 3 maturity in the reference certification maturity model of Cloud Security Alliance [18] .
The use of a monitoring based certification approach is necessary for assessing NR in cloud storage services. This is because the provision of this property depends on the correct realisation of an NR protocol not only by the cloud provider but also by the data producers/owners and consumers interacting with it. However, as the latter two parties are not under the control of the cloud provider and may change dynamically, they introduce uncertainties that require a dynamic form of NR assessment and certification.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Sect. II overviews related work. Sect. III presents the NR Protocol for cloud services covered by our certification model. Sect. IV gives an overview of the specification of certification models. Sect. V presents the certification model for NR. Sect. VI gives an overview of the CUMULUS framework that is used to implement the NR certification model. Finally, Sect. VII provides concluding remarks and directions for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
There are two strands of research related to this paper: (a) research on NR protocols and (b) research on certification.
While non-repudiation can be achieved by standard cryptographic mechanisms, one of the key issues in NR protocols is that of fair message transfer between the involved parties, i.e., ensuring that the communication parties follow the rules of the protocol and do not abandon execution intentionally. An approach addressing fairness by using an inline trusted third party (TTP), i.e., a TTP participating in every transmission of the protocol is presented in [2] . However, the constant involvement of TTP can lead to bottlenecks and reduced availability. Hence, other protocols use online TTPs, i.e., TTPs that do not participate in all transmissions [15] . A further improvement is the use of offline (aka optimistic) TTPs [1] , i.e., TTPs involved only in cases of disputes or network failure. This approach has been also adopted in [8] [16] . Other work focuses on securing cloud storage. Popa et al. [13] presented an NR protocol for cloud storage and Feng et al. [5] introduced four variants of NR protocols, based on digital signatures and authentication code.
Research on certification has traditionally produced methods based on the Common Criteria (CC) model [17] . These models use Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) to reflect any added assurance requirements in order to achieve a CC Certification. More recently the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) has proposed the Open Certification Framework (OCF) [18] . OCF establishes different maturity levels of certification. The 3 rd maturity level in OCF refers to certification based on continuous monitoring, i.e., the approach we advocate in this paper.
III. NON-REPUDIATION PROTOCOL FOR CLOUD SERVICES
Our certification model aims to certify adherence to the enhanced NR Protocol for clouds presented in [4] . To enable the reader understand this model, in this section, we give an overview of the underpinning NR protocol.
This protocol involves four parties: (i) a data owner/provider ("A"), (ii) a data user ("B"), (iii) the Cloud Provider ("C") and (iv) a Trusted Third Party ("TTP"). These parties interact through three phases of the protocol, which are shown in Figure 1 . These phases are: (1) the data upload phase, (2) the data download phase, and (3) a recovery phase.
Before describing these phases, we provide some definitions necessary for understanding them:
• NRO: Evidence of Non-Repudiation of Origin, sent by a sender to a receiver. The receiver will hold this evidence as proof if the sender denies having sent the message.
• NRR: evidence of Non-Repudiation of Receipt, sent by the receiver to the sender. The sender will hold this evidence as a proof if the receiver denies having received the message.
• f M : Flag indicating the intended purpose of a message M.
• l: Unique label chosen by A to link all messages.
• M: Message sent from a sender to a receiver.
• H(M): Hash function applied to message M.
• K: Message key defined by the sender.
• B L : Group of data users B i who are authorised to download message M and are capable of decrypting it.
• Seq i : Unique sequence number of each message.
• EG B (): Group encryption scheme known only to B L group.
• E X (Y): Asymmetric encryption of message Y produced by party X's public key.
• S X (Y): signature of message Y produced by X's private key.
The three phases of the protocol are described below.
A. Upload Phase
In this phase the data owner A sends a request to the cloud provider C, for uploading data. Firstly, A encrypts a message M (i.e., the data) with a key K and generates two different NROs: NRO AB and NRO AC . NRO AB will be used by data users B to get the key K required to decrypt M and S A (H(M)) to verify the data integrity after downloading M from C. A encrypts NRO AB using the group encryption scheme EG B () to guarantee that only the intended recipients of the B L can have access and decipher NRO AB and M. NRO AC is the proof of evidence that A sent the request to C and is encrypted with C's public key. This step is defined as: 
(H(M)),S C (EG B (NRO AB )),S C (H(l,Seq 4 ,T g4 ))}.
When B gets the data and the EG B from C, it will obtain K and H(Data) by decrypting the NRO AB and check the integrity of the data and the validity of NRR CB .
C. Resolution of Disputation
If A does not receive the expected response from the C, it sends a request to TTP with its identification and the NRO AC . TTP will subsequently send this request to C and C should respond with a corresponding NRR CA . The latter exchanges are defined as:
TTP C: RQS TC = {f RQS TC , l, A, C, TTP, Seq 5 , T g5 , T 3 , E C (NRO AC ), E C (NRO TC )} C TTP: RSP CT = {f RSP CT , l, A, C, TTP, Seq 6 , T g6 , T S , E A (NRR CA ), E T (NRR CT )} Where:
• T 3 is the maximum time that the sender will wait for an NRR to RQS TC .
• T g5 (T g6 ) is the time of the generation of RQS TC (RSP CT ).
• T S is the time when data was stored by C.
• NRO TC is the NRO sent from TTP to C to resolve a disputation regarding an uploading session of A, defined as NRO TC ={S T (H(l, A, C, TTP, Seq 5 , Tg 5 , T 5 , E C (NRO AC )))}. • NRR CT is sent from C to TTP, defined as NRR CT ={S C (H(l, Seq 5 , T g5 , NRR CA ))}.

IV. CERTIFICATION MODEL FOR NON-REPUDIATION
In CUMULUS, certificates may be generated on the basis of evidence gathered through continuous monitoring from the cloud provider. The cloud provider (i.e., the target of certification), the security property to be certified, the extent of the monitoring evidence that must be collected to assess the property, and the process of certification are specified by a monitoring based certification model (MBCM). This model drives the operation of the CUMULUS framework (see Sect. VI), which produces certificates that are signed off by a certification authority that accepts MBCM either automatically or following some audit. In the following, we present an MBCM for the NR property following an overview of the schema for specifying such models that is used by CUMULUS.
A. Monitoring based certification models: Background
A monitoring based certification model is specified in an XML based language whose top-level structure is shown in Figure 2 .
According to this schema, an MBCM specifies: (1) the cloud service to be certified (i.e., a Target of Certification (TOC)); (2) the security property to be certified for TOC; (3) the certification authority who will sign the certificates generated by the model; (4) an assessment scheme defining general conditions regarding the evidence that must be collected for being able to issue a certificate; (5) further validity tests regarding the configuration of the cloud provider and the CUMULUS framework itself that must be satisfied prior to issuing certificates; (6) the monitoring configurations that will be used in order to collect the evidence required for generating certificates; (7) the way in which the collected evidence will be aggregated in certificates (evidence aggregation); and (8) a life cycle model that defines the overall process of issuing certificates. In MBCMs, a ToC is specified as a concrete endpoint with a set of service interfaces that are offered by it to external parties (provided interfaces) and a set of interfaces required of external parties (required interfaces). The security property to be certified is specified by assertions expressed in ECAssertion, i.e., an XML language based on Event Calculus [18] .
The assessment scheme defines conditions regarding the evidence that must be collected in order to be able to issue a certificate. These conditions are related to: (i) the sufficiency of the collected evidence, (ii) the expiration period for certificates, and (iii) anomalies and conflicts that should be monitored during the certification process. The evidence sufficiency conditions may relate to the minimum required period of time that the ToC should be monitored and the minimum number and representativeness of events (i.e., instances of ToC operations) that should be gathered before a certificate can be issued.
In an MBCM, anomalies refer to: (1) potential attacks on TOC, (2) other suspicious behaviour or (3) operational conditions related to the security property that is to be certified.
(1)-(3) are monitored since they may potentially affect the satisfiability of the security property and, therefore, lead to the suspension or revocation of the certificate generated by the model. The definition of the potential "anomalies" that should be monitored as part of a certification model should be based on an analysis of potential attacks. This analysis should cover ways in which the behaviour of different external actors that interact with TOC and the overall operating conditions of the interaction between TOC and these actors may affect the satisfaction of the given security property by the TOC. Like security properties, anomalies are also specified as ECAssertions, except that their violation does not lead automatically to the suspension/revocation of a certificate.
Conflicts aim to capture cases where a given security property would not be satisfied if it were to be assessed over different monitoring aggregation periods. The availability of a service may, for instance, be above 99% if assessed on a monthly basis by certification model whose security property refers to this period of assessment, but it may be below this threshold if shorter/longer assessment intervals are considered. In an MBCM conflicts are defined by alternative assessment periods for the security property.
The life cycle model of an MBCM defines the process by which certificates of the MBCM can be generated and managed (e.g., suspended, revoked). In an MBCM, a life cycle model (LCM) is defined by a state transition model expressed in XML, as shown in Figure 3 . In particular, a life cycle model is defined by a set of states and transitions between them. States can be composite or atomic. Composite states are refined into parallel or mutally exclusive substates. All state types can be associated with actions that are executed upon entry to or exit from the state, Transitions are associated by call events or triggering conditions (when-conditions). They can also be guarded by further conditions and be associated with actions that are executed when a transition is to be traversed and prior to arriving at the destination state. Actions correspond to invocations of operations in required and provided interfaces that are defined as part of an LTM. Provided interfaces include operations offered from the CUMULUS framework and required interfaces define operations of external tools.
Further details regarding the specification of MBCMs are available from [20] .
V. CERTIFICATION MODEL FOR NR
A. Security property assertions for NR Protocol
In order to certify a cloud provider C for NR, we should monitor the responses (NRR) that C makes to NROs received from A, B and TTP during the different phases of the NR protocol shown in Figure 1 . In particular, it is necessary to gather evidence demonstrating that, for every NRO that C receives from an NR party, C produces an NRR to it in a timely manner (i.e., without a delay that would make the relevant external party to be timed out).
In the case of NROs sent during the upload phase of the protocol, the assertion in the NR MBCM contains the monitoring rule R1 and the monitoring assumptions R1.A1-R1.A4 listed below 1 : ! %! ))02%0 %0 % %0 0 %+0 % 0 ,* ∧ ¬ #) %0%0 *% 0 $⇒ ))03%0 %0 % %0 *%0 3%+0 %0 7)0 2*,* ! ) -0 % 0% 0 % 0 % 0% 0 )*% 0 ) *% 02% 0 2% 0 2% 0 ) % % ) )***% 0 ) ) )*% ) *% 0 ) % % ) )***% )% 2% 2% 2***.
8 -0 % 0% 0 % 0 % 0% 0 )*% 0 ) *% 03% 0 3% 0 % 0 ) ) )**% ) )% 3% 3% % ) ) )*% ) *%0 ) % % ) )***% )% 2% 2% 2******. %" (! ))02%0 %0 % %0 *%0 %+0 %0 ,* ∧¬ #) %0% 0 *% 0 $ ∧ ))03% 0 % 0 % % 0 *% 0 3% +0 3%0 3,* ∧ 0 3 9 0 2 7 )0 2* ⇒ #)03% 0 % 0 % % *% ) % % 0 3*% 0 3* Rule R1 checks if for every request (RQS AC ) made by a data owner (_A) for uploading data to a cloud provider (_C) at some time _t AReq (i.e., the time that the request was received by _C) and for which there is no previous request with the same sequence number received by _C from _A, _C sends a response to _A acknowledging the request (RSP CA ) within at most f(_t 1 ) time units after _t AReq , where _t 1 is the time that the data owner will wait for the response. f(_t 1 ) is a function that is provided by _C and should satisfy the constraint f(_t 1 ) < _t 1 in order to minimise the likelihood of _A be timed out due to a delayed response from _C.
The certification model keeps also a record of: (a) Requests (RQS AC ) for which a matching response (RSP CA ) was produced within the required time period and when no other previous request was made with the same sequence number, (b) Requests for which no matching response was produced within the required time period, (c) Requests that had the same sequence number with requests responded previously, and (d) The total number of responded and non-responded requests made from A to C for uploading data. To keep these records MBCM uses the monitoring assumptions R1.A1-R1.A4. R1.A1 is used to initiate the fluent UplReq(_C, _UPN, _ST), which keeps the total number of the responded requests between _A and _C (i.e., the value of the variable _UPN and systime() is a standard system call that is executed by the monitor to obtain the current time of the system where the monitoring service is running. R1.A2 updates the fluent UplReq(_C, _UPN, _ST) in order to increase the number of the successfully responded request for uploading data made from A to C (_UPN+1). It also initiates the fluent ResUplReq(RQS AC , RSP CA , _t g2 ), in order to record details of the data upload request that was responded in time. The third assumption (R1.A3) keeps a record of data upload requests that were not responded in time, using the fluent NoResUplReq(RQS AC , _t AReq ). These correspond to violations of the monitoring rule R1. R1.A4 monitors and keeps a record of data upload requests that were responded but not within the required time limit. The assumption initiates the fluent LateUplReq(RQS AC , RSP CA , _t g2 ) to keep record of the requests responded with delay.
The records of responded, non-responded and not in time responded requests are used as detailed evidence by the certification framework, in order to be able to demonstrate the correctness of the protocol implementation by a cloud provider to relevant stakeholders and inform further analysis related to anomalies that may be detected (see Sect. V.B). These stakeholders could be: (a) a cloud provider who might have failed to obtain a certificate or a cloud provider who has obtained a certificate and wishes to provide detailed evidence about it, (b) a data producer who wishes to choose a cloud provider that is certified for the NR security property by checking the evidence, or (c) an auditor who can use these evidence for auditing purposes of a cloud provider.
Keeping these records is necessary as the information recorded can be used as evidence in the recovery phase, when a TTP sends a request to C for resolving a disputation between C and A. More specifically, if C receives a request from a TTP regarding a previous request RQS AC from A to C, having this information the framework will be able to check whether a late response RSP CA from C to A lead to the resolution phase.
The certification model for NR monitors also the responses that C provides to data download requests received from data users B. The monitoring rules and assumptions for this are similar to R1 and R1.A1-R1.A4, expect that that the monitor RQS BC requests and RSP CB responses. It also monitors the behaviour of C in response to requests by TTP, in order to resolve disputes that might occur between C and A or B. For this purpose, it uses the following EC-Assertion formulae: &! ))02%0%0 % %0 *%0 %+0 %0 ,* ∧ ¬ #) % 0% 0 6*% 0 * ⇒ ))03%0 %0 %0 *%0 %+0 %0 7)0 4*, ! 8 -0 % 0% 0 % 0 % 0% 05% 0 5% 0 4% 0 ) ) )*% ) *%0 ) %% ) )***% )%2% 2% 2***% ) ) )% % %%5% 5% 5% )) )*% ) *%0 ) %% ) ) ***% )%2% 2% 2******.
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As in the case of the interactions with the data owner, the NR certification model uses the following assumptions to keep record of (a) every request (RQS TC ) for which a matching response (RSP CT ) was produced within the required time period, (b) every request RQS TTPC for which no matching response RSP CTTP was produced within the required time period, (c) every request made with a same sequence number of a previous responded request, and (d) the total number of responded and non responded requests made from TTP to C for resolving a dispute between the other parties.
B. Anomaly Detection
In the following we present anomalies of three different types introduced in Sect. IV.A for the NR certification model.
1) Potential attacks
In the case of NR, As and Bs may be non trusted parties. Both of them, for instance, may try to launch denial-of-service (DoS) attack or replay attacks on C. This may happen directly by, for example, issuing a high volume of data uploading and downloading requests to C or re-issuing previous requests (replay attack). It should be noted that the monitoring rule R1 in the certification model would require C to respond to a request from a data provider only if this request has not been responded before. Hence, the certification model assumes that C should not respond to repeated requests. However, even if no response of C is expected in such cases, a high volume of repeated requests may escalate to a DoS attack that will prevent C from satisfying the NR property.
Hence the purpose of anomaly monitoring is not to detect the individual instances of repeated requests from A to C but to detect whether this unexpected activity appears in high volume. To monitor and keep a record of the repeated requests from particular data owners, the NR certification model includes the following anomaly detection monitoring assumptions:
The first of these assumptions initialises the counter of repeated requests from a given data owner _A to "0" and the second increases it whenever a new previously responded requests is re-played by A.
Further to these anomaly-monitoring assumptions, the NR certification model can include a warning to the certification authority regarding the potential compromise of NR as soon as the number of repeated data upload requests exceeds a given threshold (i.e., N repeated data upload requests per minute). This is specified in the life cycle model of the NR certification model, as indicated in Figure 4 below.
To cover the potential of a similar type of attack from data users (B), the NR certification model includes also anomalymonitoring assumptions similar to those listed above for data downloading requests RQS BC .
2) Suspicious behaviour An example of suspicious behaviour that the NR certification model should monitor is the receipt of requests for recovery from TTP corresponding to requests for data uploading (downloading) from A (B), which have been acknowledged by C. Such requests are suspicious since, in normal circumstances, TTP should not be asking for a recovery of a request that has been acknowledged by C (i.e., a request from A or B for which C has sent an NRR).
This anomalous behaviour from TTP may be due to different reasons. To issue a recovery request, TTP should know the details of the original data uploading (downloading) request from A (B). There are four different ways in which TTP can obtain this knowledge: (i) A or B might have sent the original request to TTP and ask it to initiate the recovery phase, (ii) an attacker, who has managed to obtain the details of the original request of A and B and impersonate them, sends it to TTP, or (iii) TTP has itself acted as an attacker, obtained the details of the original request from A or B (as in (ii)), and sent the recovery request to C.
Case (i) itself may be the result of a malicious attempt to initiate the recovery phase by A or B. The reason for this could be, for example, to test via TTP how C and TTP would react to such non normal requests and whether it would be possible to launch some DoS attack onto C (via TTP) or onto TTP itself. However, (i) can also be the result of A or B being timed out due to a (non malicious) delay in the arrival of the NRR A(B) sent to them by C that has been caused by the network connection between A(B) and C.
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3) (Anomalous) Operating conditions
The third type of anomalies that could be monitored by an MBCM are potentially interfering operational conditions. An example of such condition that should be monitored by the NR certification model is the average time that it takes for a response from C to reach its intended recipient party (i.e., A, B or TTP). Monitoring this time is important as it might indicate that responses to A, B or TTP reach them with delays that can get them timed out, despite C having issued these responses within the time period required by the NR protocol (i.e., within the period [_t AReq ,_t AReq +f(_t 1 )] that is required by rule R1 in the case of NRRs from C to A). Such delays might be due to network delays or some man-in-the-middle attack on the communication C and A, B and TTP.
Monitoring the exact average time of the arrival of a NRR from C to A, B or TTP is not possible as in general the monitoring framework of the certification authority that realises the NR certification model does not have access to events occurring at A and B. An approximate estimate of this average time is, however, possible by monitoring the average time of network traffic in the opposite direction, i.e., the average time that it takes for RQS AC , RQS BC and RQS TC to reach C after being dispatched by A, B or TTP.
The following anomaly monitoring assumptions show how the NR certification model monitors the network delay for traffic from A to C:
0 %+0 % 0 ,* ∧ #" )0 %0 % 0"%0*% 0 $ ⇒ ))02%0 %0 % %0 *% " )0 %0 % 0"%0*%0 * ∧ ))02%0 %0 % %0 *% " )0 %0 %)0"/0 7 )0 (0 2**')072*%)072**% 0 * The anomaly assumption A.A3 initiates the fluent avgAC(_A,_C, _avg,_N) that is used to keep a record of the average time that it takes for data upload requests RQS AC to reach C from A. Within it, _avg is the variable keeping the average value and _N is the variable keeping the number of requests that have been taken into account for calculating this average. A.A4 updates avgAC(_A,_C, _avg,_N) by recalculating the values of _avg to take into account the travelling time of the last RQS AC , i.e., _t AReq -_t g1 (_t g1 is recorded in RQS AC as shown in the specification of rule R1). In this case, the certification model should raise a warning to the certification authority in cases where _avg > f(t1), as this would lead to A being systematically timed out due to delays in the network traffic between A and C. This warning is also shown in the NR certificate life cycle model in Sect. IV.3. The NR MBCM includes also anomaly-monitoring assumptions similar to Anomaly.A.A3 and Anomaly.A.A4 for Bs and TTPs.
C. Life Cycle model
The life-cycle model of the NR certification model is shown in Figure 4 . According to this model, the first state in the certificate's lifecycle is called Activated, where the certification process i activated. After being activated, the certificate process moves to the state Continuous Monitoring. Whilst being in this state, the security property and anomaly detection monitoring rules and assumptions of the model are being monitored (by the monitor of the CUMULUS platform) and the related monitoring evidence is sent to the framework (see transition evidence(e:MonResult)). When the accumulated evidence meets the sufficient conditions of the model and the security property monitoring rules are satisfied, the process moves to the state Pre-Issued (see transition when(secassertion-satisfied AND sufficiency-conditions-satisfied) from D1 to Pre-Issued). At this state, the framework will check if the extra validity conditions for the certificate type (see action CheckValidityConditions) and, if they are satisfied, the process will move to the state Issued, at which a concrete certificate for NR of the specific provider is generated internally by the platform and can be obtained by an interested external party upon request (see transition retrieveCertificate). Whilst in Issuing state, if an anomaly is detected, the certification process will move to the state Anomaly-Audit, (see transition when(unresolved-anomalies)) where all the detected anomalies must be selected (see state AnomalySelection) and inspected (see state AnomalyInspection) one by one. This is the responsibility of the certification authority that will sign off the certificates. If all the detected anomalies can be resolved, the process moves back to History state, i.e., the state where it was prior to moving to Anomaly-Audit. Otherwise, if there are anomalies that cannot be resolved (i.e., accepted as affordable risks), the process moves to the state Revoke, where any certificates issued for the particular TOC will be revoked and no further certificates will be issued.
When the expiration date of an issued certificate is reached, as stated in the ExpirationCondition of MBCM, the certification process will move to state D1 (see the transition when (expiration-conditions)). At this point if a sufficient body evidence has already been accumulated for issuing a new instance of the certificate, the process will move automatically to the state Issuing or otherwise it will continue gathering evidence until a new certificate instance can be issued.
VI. CUMULUS FRAMEWORK
MBCMs are enacted by the CUMULUS framework to produce and manage certificates. The CUMULUS framework consists of a certification communicator (CC), a certificate generator (CG), a monitoring manager (MM), and a certification models (MBCM), an evidence (EDB) and a certificate database (CeDB) . It also interacts with external monitors (MON), as shown in Figure 5 .
The monitoring manager (MM) is responsible for creating and modifying MBCMs according to the actors' requirements, and for managing the monitoring process for certifying a specific security property. Moreover, MM provides the monitoring configuration of an MBCM to MON, and polls the monitor at regular intervals in order to collect monitoring results. Once retrieved, these results are stored in EDB. The certification communicator (CC) allows external actors to retrieve generated (issued) certificates. CC retrieves such certificates from the CeDB.
The certificate generator (CG) has responsibility for enacting MBCMs in order to generate and manage certificates. CG acts as an executor of the life cycle model of MBCM. During this execution it also access and updates information in EDB. When a certificate is generated, it is stored in the CeDB. The monitor (MON) is responsible for monitoring the security property and anomaly assertions specified in MBCM. To do so, it is given these assertions by the framework and checks them against cloud event streams that are generated by event captors (EC) placed on cloud infrastructures. The communication between EC and MON is based on an event bus, which is implemented as a pub/sub infrastructure.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced a certification model = for the NR protocol of cloud services that is based on continuous monitoring. This model defines the conditions that should be monitored at runtime in order to confirm that a cloud provider adheres to the protocol and therefore offers the NR property. Furthermore, it defines conditions regarding the sufficiency of monitoring evidence for issuing NR certificates, anomalies that should be monitored during the certification, and the overall life cycle model (process) for generating such certificates. Our model has been implemented using the CUMULUS certification framework.
Currently, we are conducting an evaluation of the performance of this model and investigate how to deploy model checking techniques in order to statically verify certain properties of it (e.g., soundness) and more generally of certification models following the CUMULUS approach, prior to putting them in operation. This work is exploring the use of model checking techniques for this purpose.
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